This paper is concerned with the more difficult problem of predicting future events, and will say very little on the use of probability statements regarding past or present events (e.g. 'the North Koreans now have an arsenal of eight nuclear bombs'). Nevertheless some of the results of this paper may be employed in a straightforward way to estimations of past and present events.
In Israel's history the notion of probability has a traumatic connotation when taken together with Intelligence estimation. It has to do with the strategic surprise of the Yom Kippur war in October 1973, where the head of IDF Intelligence told the IDF general staff meeting on 5 October 1973 -a day before Egypt and Syria attacked Israel -that the probability of war is 'low, even lower than low'. As Shlomo Nakdimon notes in his important book on the war, which is titled Low Probability, no one really understood the meaning of predicting a low probability of future war. But it soon became a symbol for the failure of the Intelligence establishment to predict the war. Nakdimon cites Golda Meir, Israel's prime minister at the time, as saying after the war (that ultimately caused her resignation from office) 'they all said in a uniform voice: ''It is not probable that there will be a war, it is not probable!'' Since then I can't hear the word probable, and I can't define it. Every time I hear this word I am shivering'.
1 Clearly, Meir would be happy if she could have had a proper understanding of the meaning of probabilistic statements included in strategic predictions. This paper is meant to be a contribution to such a discussion.
The aim of the following paper is to find an interpretation for the use of probability in Intelligence estimations, and specifically for Intelligence forecast, in order to 'save' the option of using probability propositions meaningfully in the course of the process of strategic estimations. The first part of the paper will describe different philosophical interpretations that were suggested for the notion of probability, while the second part will try to find the interpretation that most suits the Intelligence estimation and analysis work. Then the implications of the second part's conclusions for different day-to-day aspects of the Intelligence work will be analyzed. This work is preliminary and incomplete and it is meant mainly to stimulate a discussion of its content and conclusions.
THREE POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS FOR THE CONCEPT OF PROBABIL ITY
This part will introduce three different philosophical interpretations for probability, which I will hold are the only three interpretations possible.
2 This will be important for the course of the following argument in which -upon trying to find a suitable interpretation for use in Intelligence analysis -an elimination process will be employed to choose from the three different possible interpretations. If we were to introduce a fourth or a fifth interpretation we would have to reconsider the argument that will be presented later on.
The three interpretations that will be discussed in the following are the a priori interpretation, the relative frequencies interpretation, and the subjective interpretation. It is important to mention at the outset that the different approaches are all in agreement with regard to the fact that the mathematical theory of probability is valid. All the probability laws of mathematics are true, and there will be no attempt in this paper at disproving any of them. Thus, for example, it is clear that if the probability of getting the result 4 while throwing a dice is 1/6, then the probability of getting the result 4 twice in two independent throws of a dice will be 1/6 6 1/6 ¼ 1/36. There are two questions which are disputed by the different parties in this philosophical debate:
1) How should we calculate 'atomic probabilities' of atomic events such as the probability of getting the result 5 upon throwing a dice? An atomic event is an event that cannot be reduced to a set of simpler events. Thus, the event of getting a result of (4, 5) in two different throws of a dice is complex (and not atomic), due to the fact that it is a compound of two atomic events. 2) What is the meaning of atomic probabilities? How should they be used in everyday life? What can one learn and how should one act in the future if one knows that the probability for a certain event is low or 25%?
The A Priori Interpretation of Probability
The principles of this interpretation are:
1) Probability is a logical relation between statements.
2) Probability should always be given in relation to a given base of knowledge. 3) Probability is determined a priori, i.e. with no need of experiments.
Those principals should be more carefully explained. First, by the a priori interpretation, probability theory is part of logic. In (classical) logic we are interested in the validity of arguments such as: all Greeks are mortal; Socrates is Greek; therefore, Socrates is mortal. Probability theory -according to the a priori interpretation -is also interested in valid arguments, but different families of arguments. Whereas in logic the conclusion should necessarily be implied by the assumptions for the argument to be valid, probability theory is concerned with arguments where the conclusion is not necessarily implied by the assumptions. Thus, the following argument,
The sun was rising yesterday morning in the east; the sun was rising the day before yesterday in the morning in the east; the sun was rising three days ago in the morning in the east; and so on and so forth for the last century; Therefore, the sun will rise tomorrow morning in the east is not valid by standard logic since clearly the fact that the sun was rising every morning until today does not necessarily imply the rising of the sun tomorrow morning (a big comet may strike earth tonight and take it off course). But given all the knowledge embodied in the assumptions, one could say that there is a high probability that the sun will rise tomorrow morning.
To give yet another example, from the assumptions 'China had opened its economy and changed the communist ideology to allow for economic growth; China is acquiring a lot of technological knowledge from the west; the population of China is huge' one cannot deduce necessarily that China will become a superpower in 25 years from now, but it is possible to conclude that there is a high probability that China will become a superpower.
The most important proponent of this interpretation of probability is the economist Keynes.
3 Moving to the second principle above, according to Keynes there is no sense to the proposition 'The probability for an event X is Y', because as in logic one has to specify the assumptions on which one bases one's probabilistic conclusion. Only when the assumptions are specified can the probability of the conclusion be fixed, because for different assumptions there will be different probabilities for the same conclusion. Thus, if one only knows that the sun had risen this morning in the east (e.g. all past data had been lost) the probability that it will rise tomorrow morning will clearly be different (lower) than the case where one looks at the astronomical knowledge that spans the last century or millennium. That is why probability should always be given with the knowledge base that was used to determine it. Different knowledge bases will result in different estimations as to the probability of a desired outcome.
The third principle above is a consequence of the first and the second. Since probability is part of logic, and since the validity of arguments in logic is a priori, therefore the probability of propositions must also be determined a priori. Just as one does not need to make any experiment to know that the argument 'all Greeks are mortal; Socrates is Greek; therefore, Socrates is mortal' is valid, one does not need an experiment to know what is the probability of the sun rising tomorrow given the base of an astronomical knowledge of the past decade. Given different astronomical knowledge bases, 4 the consequent probabilities for the sun rising tomorrow are given without any need for experiments. For different assumptions, different conclusions will emerge. The one who tries to predict the future probabilities is doing so on the basis of given assumptions. Verifying those assumptions is of course an important task (parallel to the distinction in classical logic between 'validity' and 'soundness' of arguments), but it has nothing to do with predicting the probabilities. Probabilities are predicted on the basis of given assumptions, with no connection to the verification of those assumptions by experiments. This is the reason for naming this interpretation 'a priori'. However, the interesting question has not yet been answered: how does one 'calculate' atomic probabilities? How does one know upon getting the raw data what the actual probability is of the sun rising tomorrow or of China becoming the next superpower? This is the most crucial question for practicing strategic analysts and decision makers. Keynes thinks intuition should be used to answer that question. This is a disappointing view, but it is necessary to take a moment to look into it. Of course, it seems useless to hold this view for practical purposes, since 'intuition' seems too vague a concept to use in organizations that are meant to be accountable. Just imagine a senior analyst coming to the prime minister's office, telling him that the probability of war is now 'high'. This is a very alarming announcement. But when the prime minister asks how the analyst came to that conclusion, the only answer available (at the bottom line) is 'by intuition'. Most decision makers will resist such an answer.
But at least one thing is achieved by the a priori interpretation: if two analysts get the same knowledge base, and they both predict different probabilities for the future event, one of them must be wrong. As part of logic, there is only one true answer to the question what is the probability of the event given the relevant knowledge base. Keynes does not give any procedure to calculate the desired probability, but he claims there is only one possible answer to this question. He argues that one should use intuition in order to determine the probability of the future event, but he does not conclude that the probability is only a subjective prediction. This apparent contradiction is important, but let us leave it for now and go on to describe the other two interpretations. This problem of intuition in the a priori interpretation will be discussed further later on in the paper.
The Relative Frequencies Interpretation
This interpretation of probability is the most common-sense interpretation and the one best known and most frequently used in the sciences. Being the most intuitive interpretation and the most closely related to the sciences, it is also the interpretation most often criticized by some social scientists when others try to use it for social predictions. The relative frequencies interpretation has only one simple principle: the probability of an event ¼ the relative frequency of its past occurrences. Thus, if past statistics are available according to which one-quarter of a group of patients who had a certain disease died in the first year after it started, then a new patient with the same disease has a 1/4 probability of death in the coming year. This is the way insurance companies, basically, make their money. Those companies have vast databases of statistics that allow them to compute the future probability that a new customer will lose his job, die or have his car stolen. Using those probabilities they can calculate the price of an insurance plan for this customer. The probability according to this interpretation is determined a posteriori rather than a priori: it is only after the data is gathered that one can calculate, precisely, the predicted probability for the event.
But what is the basis for this calculation? How does one know that the past statistics will be preserved in the future? This question is a famous problem in philosophy, the so-called induction problem. The hidden assumption in this interpretation is that what happened in the past will also occur in the future, or at least the patterns of the past can inductively be projected into the future. However, as Hume (1711-76) showed, there is no reason to believe this inductive principle: there is no real reason to believe that what happened in the past will repeat itself in the future. Even natural laws -according to Hume -are nothing but empty generalizations of raw data of the past. The fact that human beings had seen enormous numbers of apples falling from trees to the ground does not imply that all apples will necessarily always fall down or that gravity is a built-in feature of the universe.
Mathematicians had found a formal solution to Hume's problem of induction: they decided that the probability for an event ¼ the relative frequency of similar events in the past where the number of experiments (events in the database) is infinite. In mathematical vocabulary the probability equals the limit of the relative frequency when the number of experiments is infinite. But this definition also renders this interpretation unpractical -we never actually have infinite data in real life. We need to take decisions (personal, political, ethical) on a finite database. Unlike what some people tend to think, having simply a vast number of events (yet a finite one) in the database is not enough to conclude that the computed probability is necessarily true.
However, there is a further and deeper problem with the relative frequency interpretation. This is the problem of the 'sample'. The relative frequency should be calculated by taking the ratio of events in which the desired result was achieved divided by the total number of events (those in which the desired result was achieved and those in which different results occurred). But what are the relevant events that should be counted in order to calculate the value of the denominator? An example from the insurance world would be useful here. Imagine a new client comes into Lloyd's office and asks for life insurance. The insurance agent is looking at his computer for the database of people of the age of this customer (say 45), and calculates how many of them died by the age of 60. Assume Lloyd's has a database of a million clients. Hence, by the relative frequency interpretation the probability that this new customer would die by the age of 60 equals the statistic of those in Lloyd's database who died between the ages of 45 and 60.
But then the agent finds out that the customer is Israeli. Clearly the huge database of a million past customers is not relevant for an Israeli because his chances of dying are higher (due to security problems in the Middle East) than the chances of a Scandinavian customer. So the agent should now consider the sample only of past Israeli customers. But then again, this specific customer is a fan of extreme sports: skiing, riding a motorbike, and skydiving. Therefore the sample should be even smaller: only Israelis who are involved in extreme sports should be counted in. Taking this argument further (considering the new customer's specific medical and genetic background, and so on), one must conclude that the sample of relevant events are only the events where he himself dies before the age of 60, which is of course a reduction ad absurdum of the relative frequencies interpretation.
The problem of the sample is highly important for Intelligence and strategic assessments, as to almost any other attempt at using probability statements in the social sciences. Trying to use relative frequency interpretation to predict the probability of an Israeli -Syrian war in the coming year (a major strategic question for decision makers in Israel) seems to end up with an absurdity. Should one divide the number of past wars between the two countries (say 5) by the number of years the two countries have existed (say 50) to get an answer that the probability for war is 1/10? Why not divide the number of wars (5) by the number of days the two countries exist (50 6 365) which will result in a much lower probability? And does the 1948 war have any relevance for predicting future possible wars (the 1948 war happened after World War II, when the Soviet Union was a superpower, there was a different leadership in the Arab world and so on)? It seems stupid and useless on the face of it. The problem of the relevant sample seems to bring us to a dead end with the relative frequencies interpretation.
To put the sample problem in yet other words, we could say that if the external circumstances were constant, one could use the relative frequency interpretation even for predicting future war. If nothing had changed between Israel and Syria from 1973 to the present, we could use the 1973 war as an input in our frequencies calculations for a future war. That is the meaning of 'laboratory' in the science. When a scientist rehearses an experiment 1000 times just to come to the conclusions that, let us say, the object of research breaks down in a third of the cases, it is possible because of an assumption that the conditions of the different repetitions of the experiment were the same. There was no significant change in the external surrounding that could cause a change in the experiment's results. In the same vein, to say that 'the chances of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons in the next five years is 60%' could have been interpreted according to the relative frequencies of other states acquiring nuclear weapons in the past, if we only could be sure that the circumstances are the same. That is, if we could guarantee something like a laboratory for our strategic predictions. Alas, no such laboratory is available; hence the problem of the sample is detrimental for using this interpretation for strategic predictions. I believe that the harsh criticism against using probabilities in the social sciences, coming from those who identify themselves as part of the 'interpretive' approach to the social sciences, is directed mainly against the use of the relative frequencies interpretation. The main reason why probabilities should not be applicable to social events is for the lack of anything like a 'laboratory' for the social sciences. A secondary reason has to do with the free will of the social agent. I will discuss this second reason below, in the section entitled 'Lessons to be Learned'.
The Subjective Interpretation
This interpretation is very simple, but its main weakness is precisely that simplicity. According to the subjective interpretation, 5 probabilities are nothing but propositions that report a subjective feeling of the utterer regarding the future occurrence of the event. Unlike the a priori interpretation, this interpretation allows for two different legitimate answers from two different analysts, even if both of them used the same data to get to their prediction. If both of them gave a genuine description of their real feeling, they are both right even if one of them predicted an 80% chance of war and the other predicted only a 5% chance for the same future event. This interpretation should be seen also as a reaction to the problems of the two other interpretations (the need to use an unexplained 'intuition' in the a priori interpretation, and the sample problem in the relative frequency interpretation). Since there was no success in finding a true answer to the problem of future probabilities with the two other possible interpretations, the conclusion must be that the prediction is nothing more than a subjective assertion.
The main difference between the subjective interpretation and the two other interpretations, as the title 'subjective' may suggest, is that it is not committed to one true answer to any question regarding probabilities. The only things available to us are different subjective answers to the question 'what is the probability for a future event X?' Sometimes these answers are collected by asking different people for the bets they will be willing to put on their answers as a measure for their genuine subjective feeling regarding the issue. Recall that although the a priori interpretation does not present any formula to calculate future probabilities (unlike the relative frequencies interpretation that does introduce such a formula), it nevertheless insists that there is only one true answer to any question regarding future probabilities. This is due to the fact that the a priori interpretation understands probability to be part of logic. Since in logic there is only one true answer to the question whether a conclusion X is valid based on assumptions Y 1 . . . Y n , it should also be the case that there is one true answer to any question regarding the probability of future events.
I consider this distinction between subjective and a priori interpretations very important. Frequently people fail to distinguish the two. To ascertain whether an interlocutor is using the a priori or the subjective interpretation, the interlocutor needs to be asked a simple question: is there only one true answer to the probability of the future event? If the answer is 'yes' then he is using a priori interpretation; if 'no' then it is the subjective interpretation. Notice that a positive answer to the question does not imply in any sense that the interlocutor is certain that his answer is the true answer. He may doubt whether his answer is the true one and still believe that there is in principle only one possible answer. This distinction will prove crucial in the following discussion regarding which interpretation should be used in the estimation process of future strategic events.
WHI CH I NT ERPRETATI ON SHOUL D BE USED FOR STRAT EGIC ASSESSMENT?
Following the description of the three possible interpretations it is time to consider which one of them should be applied to the Intelligence estimation process and to strategic assessments about future events. The main interest of this paper is with strategic estimations like those trying to predict possible future wars, regime stability, economic developments, etc. In different kinds of predictions, such as trying to predict the life expectancy of a certain leader who is known to suffer from a certain disease, one should clearly use relative frequency, as doctors all around the world do. The same holds for computing the probability of certain ammunition penetrating the enemy's amour. The relative frequencies are the best option available in those cases, despite the philosophical problems involved (such as the sample problem; I believe in those cases, since the database is usually big enough and laboratory conditions are available, one could safely use the relative frequencies interpretation). But what about the more complex cases of regime change, war and the like?
In those cases I would want to argue that it is not possible to use relative frequency interpretation. This is due to the sample problems that tend to make the use of relative frequencies impossible, as explained earlier. Trying to calculate the probability of future war by the mere numerical ratio of past occurrences seems absurd. Since it is not possible to really know the relevant parameters that will influence the next possible event, it cannot be known which past events are relevant and which should be left out. The relative frequencies interpretation that is so widespread in the sciences is just not available in the cases of strategic prediction. But the subjective interpretation is no better: it does not allow lessons to be learned from mistakes. If a war was predicted with a probability of only 5% and it did eventually break out, there is no lesson to learn. The analyst was not wrong according to the subjective interpretation if the answer was sincerely believed. Reporting a subjective feeling was right. There is nothing more to do. Lessons cannot be learned from past predictions. This is clearly a major problem for an Intelligence establishment which is massively funded by the tax payer and should be accountable for its mistakes that might cost thousands of lives of the country's citizens and soldiers.
After disqualifying the relative frequency and the subjective interpretations from playing a role in Intelligence estimations, the conclusion must be that one should use the only other interpretation possible, 6 namely the a priori interpretation. This interpretation allows lessons to be learned from mistakes because it assumes that there is only one true answer to any question about future probabilities. But it does not give any procedure to calculate those probabilities, and ask for a use of unanalyzed 'intuition'. Does that leave us with any practical solution to our problems? Does it not mean that actually the Intelligence community cannot and should not use probability propositions in strategic estimations since one cannot justify the predictions apart from saying that they represent some vague intuition of the situation? I want to try to show that there is a meaningful way to be accountable for probabilistic predictions under the assumption of a priori interpretation. To explain how that could be done I would like to discuss shortly the way lessons should be learned from assessments failure.
LESSONS TO BE LE ARNE D
It is evident that any public funded establishment should be accountable for its achievements and failures. How is it done today? Usually if there is a colossal failure of the strategic national assessment (such as regarding WMD in Iraq), a formal committee is established which has the mission of looking with hindsight into the knowledge base available and the conclusions reached by the analysts. Then, in most cases, the committee in its report will find some problems or failures of either (1) the way the information was assessed or (2) regarding the lack of relevant sources of information that were relevant for the specific event under consideration. The first failure is down to analysts in the assessment establishment while the second is the responsibility of the information gathering units (SIGINT, VISINT, HUMINT or others). Sometimes both analysis and gathering units have failed, and sometimes they were right in their predictions but failed to present the conclusions clearly enough to the decision makers.
I want to argue that from all the investigation committees' reports I have read, I came to the conclusion that there is a tacit assumption underlying all those reports that one should be aware of. Since all these committees found a problem with hindsight in either the assessment or the gathering of information (or both), one should understand that their tacit assumption was that if only there was enough information regarding the issue at question, and if the analysts were not prone to mistakes, the event should have been predicted with certainty. The committees assume that the reality the Intelligence analysts are trying to predict is determinate, and that they are using probabilities in their predictions only because of the lack of knowledge or the imperfect ability of humans to reach the right conclusions from the data in hand. If only all the necessary data had been available to the analysts, and if only analysts were not prone to err, it would be possible to predict with certainty the future regional or global events. Alas, contrary to this tacit assumption, the future events analysts try to predict are not deterministic. The main reason 8 for this is the free will of the agents involved in any political, military or economical decision makingwhose acts the Intelligence analysts try to predict. Some philosophers (and neural scientists) still do not believe in free will of human agents, but I do and my following conclusions are a result of this conviction. It would be far beyond the scope of this paper (and the abilities of the current author) to develop or defend free will here, and it is important to acknowledge that the question of free will is still widely disputed both among philosophers and among scientists. My own opinion is that humans do have this unique ability of freedom of will, hence future events that involve decisions of humans are not determined in advance by any (known or unknown) 'laws'.
What are the implications of this opinion to our subject matter? Well, if one accepts this opinion then one has to accept that sometimes future events that are genuinely not probable (say events with probability of only 10%) will actually materialize. The 10% in this case will not be due to our lack of knowledge; it will be intrinsic to the future reality of the event itself. It does not represent the analyst's hesitations, but rather reality as it is in itself. Thus, it might be the case that an analyst predicted a future war as improbable and it will eventually happen, and in spite of this seemingly clear and dangerous failure, it would be possible to conclude after proper investigation that the analyst was right after all. The war was improbable but from time to time improbable events occur.
9
Even if one accepts the principle of freedom of will, one should still see the danger in the above claim, that an analyst might be judged to be right (not only not guilty, but right!) even when the events not predicted actually happened. Since now, even an analyst that made a horrible mistake such as failing to predict a war could always plead 'not guilty' because it could be argued that actually s/he was right: the event was indeed improbable, but it was only due to the indeterminacy of reality that the event eventually materialized. The defense could be that the predicted probability of 10% for the event was the only true answer at the time of prediction. What can be done to prevent this line of argumentation? Since it was claimed earlier that an analyst should use a priori interpretation of probability it seems as if this paper's argument leads to a deadlock. The a priori interpretation demands that intuition be used, with no accepted procedure to calculate the probability of future strategic events. Although the a priori interpretation does include the assertion that there is only one true probability to the event (given the background knowledge), it seems as if there is no way to find this true probability in our everyday important events.
10 Due to the added assumption of the indeterminacy of reality, an analyst who failed to predict an important event can still plead not guilty. How can any lessons be learned from past performances of strategic assessment establishments in that way?
The surprising answer is that there after all is a way to do it. This involves monitoring the performance of a certain Intelligence establishment (or individual analyst) over time. There is no way to decide regarding a singular event (catastrophic as it may be) if the analyst predicted correctly or incorrectly and the only thing that happened was that an improbable event actually materialized. But it is possible to judge an analyst if all past predictions (say for the last five years) are gathered together. In doing sogathering for example a set of 100 different events predicted -the relative frequencies interpretation can be employed to assess the analyst's past performance. Imagine -for the simplicity of the argument and without loss of generality -that the analyst under scrutiny has a record of 100 predictions of different events, all of which the analyst predicted with probability of 20%. If one accepts that reality itself is indeterminate, one must say that if the analyst predicted correctly one would expect exactly 20 events out of the 100 to materialize. We can check with hindsight how many actually materialized and see how well the analyst predicted the future, i.e. how good is the analyst's intuition. In other words, if the 20% prediction was the true probability of the indeterminate future event, then out of 100 such predictions we should expect 20 to actually happen.
Note that according to this interpretation an analyst for whom 40 events (out of 100) materialized is as bad as an analyst for whom no event materialized. Both analysts are 20 events away from what actually should have happened had they been right in their predictions. They are both 20 events farther from the expected 20 events that should have materialized. This is contrary to everyday practical intuition. Usually, there is a tendency to think that an analyst who gave a probability of 20% to 100 events and none of them occurred is a very talented and successful analyst. After all, s/he predicted that all 100 events have small probability (20%) of occurring and indeed none of them happened. But as I have tried to explain this is the wrong conclusion if one accepts the indeterminacy of future strategic events. I believe the source of this misconception is the tendency to think that the use of probabilities by analysts is only meant to represent the analysts' imperfection (both in terms of being human and in terms of the lack of information available). But according to the proposed interpretation of probability presented in this paper, since all 100 events were attempts to predict the future indeterminate reality, about 20 of them should have materialized. What actually happened is that the analyst was requested to use intuition with regard to a specific event by itself, but later on a second layer, so to speak, was added in which the analyst's intuition was checked against past performance. This allows the use of a priori interpretation of probability for predicting strategic events, while adding up a relative frequency count of successful predictions in order to assess the analyst (or the Intelligence establishment).
It is extremely important to stress the fact that none of the above contradict or diminish the need to check the analyst's performance in a more mundane sense, such as was s/he open to suggestions from subordinate analysts, did s/ he really read all the available material and so on. It is also essential to check the resources available to the Intelligence community at the time, such as the number of agents reporting from the country of interest and the amount of SIGINT and VISINT available. Many lessons can and should be learned from these questions. However, after studying all those issues the problem which is the concern of this paper will still be open. And the claim of this paper is that to judge the predictions of an analyst one has to adopt a two-layer interpretation of probability.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, in this essay a suggestion was made that a priori probabilities should be used when trying to predict future strategic events such as wars, regime change or other global changes. This means that the only possible way to determine a certain future probability is by using the analyst's intuition.
However this does not mean that the probability propositions are subjective. A priori probabilities are used because it is only the a priori interpretation that allows for lessons to be learned from mistakes, and does not involve the problem of the relevant sample. Another central assumption of this paper is that the actual reality we are facing is probabilistic or indeterminate. Hence, by itself the occurrence of events that we predicted only with low probability does not necessarily prove a mistake. The nature of a probabilistic world is such that some low probability events will actually occur. Only an examination of a (large) class of past estimations will allow the quality of the estimation process of a person or of a certain Intelligence establishment to be determined. There is a critical need to produce actual figures (10%, 20%, 60% etc.) for our probability predictions in order to be able to check past performances. Obscure notions such as 'low probability' are not enough for lessons to be learned and might fail us in trying to achieve a genuine communication with the decision makers that have to use our Intelligence estimations.
NOTES
1 Shlomo Nakdimon, Low Probability (Revivim 1982) p.63 (in Hebrew). 2 Actually there is a fourth interpretation which is from Karl Popper. I will not present it here for the sake of simplicity, but I believe it does not change my current conclusions. The presentation in this part of the paper is based on R. Weatherford, Philosophical Foundations of Probability Theory (Methuen 1982). 3 J.M. Keynes, in his famous book A Treatise on Probability (Macmillan 1957). 4 Which in its turn does depend on experiments of course, but is not part of the work of the logician (or the probability expert). It is for the astronomer to do the experiments and for the logician to check the validity of arguments. As an analogy, we may say somewhat simplistically that intelligence gathering units should gather the raw data (like the astronomer), while the analysis unit should take the role of the probability expert to find what the conclusions are from the given data. 5 See H. Kyburg and H. Smokler, Studies in Subjective Probability (Krieger Publications 1980) . 6 See note 2 above. 7 Notice that this assumption is plausible for estimations of past and present events. The past and the present are already determined, unlike the future. So it could be expected that if we only had all the information available, we could assess with certainty what happens now everywhere in the world. The use of probability statements regarding past and present events reflects the analyst's level of ignorance, while predictions about the future combine both the gaps in the analyst's knowledge and the indeterminacy of the future. 8 A secondary one is the fact that most scientists today think our material world (leaving humans aside) is also not deterministic. This has to do with results in quantum mechanics (what is known as the Bell theorem) which I will not pursue here for obvious reasons. 9 This is actually what the head of Israel Intelligence corps in 1973, Eli Zeira, argues in his autobiographical book, Eli Zeira, Yom Kippur War: Between Myth and Reality (Israel: Yediot Acharonot 1993) (in Hebrew). 10 There might be procedures even in the a priori interpretation to calculate probabilities for simple events, but not for complex ones such as regime stability, outbreak of wars, or major terrorist attacks.
